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Abstract
Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act authorized the SEC to create a committee that would be responsible
for promulgating and enforcing rules to reward whistleblowers. Such rewards are
to be paid from the Investor Protection Fund, which is embodied in SEC Rule 21F.
The whistleblower provision is meant to promote corporate whistleblowing by
incentivizing the prevention of financial abuse. Critics contend, however, that the
whistleblower program fails to encourage corporations to strengthen internal
compliance programs; instead, corporations will put more effort into whistleblower
prevention strategies in order to prevent SEC enforcement actions.
SEC Rule 21F does not require whistleblowers to first utilize internal
corporate compliance procedures before reporting alleged wrongdoing to the SEC;
however, the SEC provides more incentives for a whistleblower who does first
utilize such corporate compliance programs. Dodd-Frank supporters assert that
corporations already implement legal strategy in order to prevent future
enforcement actions and whistleblowing. However, with the enactment of Section
922, whistleblowing is expected to increase; therefore, advocates can expect
corporations to develop and utilize more innovative whistleblower prevention
strategies.
Article
On July 21, 2010, in response to the financial abuses that occurred in 2008,
President Barack Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank” or the “Dodd Frank Act”), 1 the most
reformative piece of financial legislation since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Among the many provisions in the new legislation, Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank
Act calls for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) to establish
a whistleblower committee and to develop rules that allow whistleblower rewards
to be paid from a newly created Investor Protection Fund, which is embodied in
1. See Jesse Lee, President Obama Signs Wall Street Reform: “No Easy Task”, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July
21, 2010, 2:22 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/07/21/president-obama-signs-wall-street-reformno-easy-task.
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SEC Rule 21F. 2 Although the purpose of the new Dodd-Frank whistleblower
provision is to provide more incentive for those who assist the SEC in preventing
financial abuse, 3 critics contend that the new rules fail to properly emphasize
internal compliance initiatives. 4 Given the criticisms surrounding SEC Rule 21F,
along with the federal government’s continuous support for corporate whistleblowing, 5 lawmakers should expect corporations to continue utilizing
whistleblower prevention strategies instead of effectively strengthening their
internal compliance programs.
Looking to the debate surrounding SEC Rule 21F, critics challenge the
rule’s treatment of corporate internal compliance programs. While supporters
celebrate that the new rules have corporations running scared, critics believe that
the final requirements for SEC Rule 21F will only discourage the efforts by
corporations in improving their internal compliance programs since
whistleblowers do not need to report to them to claim a reward offered by the
SEC. 6 Mainly, critics root their frustrations to the SEC’s recent rejection of a
proposition to SEC Rule 21F, which would have required a whistleblower to bypass
an internal compliance program before being deemed eligible to receive a reward. 7
Outraged by the SEC’s rejection, critics premise their dissatisfaction on the
basis that corporations spend millions of dollars annually to improve their internal
compliance programs and to regulate themselves. According to an independent
study conducted in January 2011 by the Ponemon Institute, the average cost for
internal compliance by corporations amounts to 3.5 million dollars annually. 8
Moreover, based on a survey conducted by Ernst & Young, which lasted from 2009
to 2010, over two-thirds of all companies utilize internal compliance programs to
which forty-four percent use such programs to conduct a fraud-risk assessment
every six months. 9 In light of these numbers, Ken Springer, an expert in corporate
fraud prevention, has characterized the new whistleblower provision as “a real
slap in the face” for companies that have taken drastic measures in strengthening

2. See The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. § 748 (2009) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]; 19 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6 (2011).
3. See Dodd-Frank § 922; Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Final Rules”), Release No. 34-64545, File No. S7-33-10, 16 (Aug. 12, 2011),
available at http://sec.gov/rules/final/2011/34-64545.pdf [hereinafter Final Rules]; 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F et seq.
(2011).
4. See GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUTCHER, SEC ADOPTS FINAL RULES IMPLEMENTING WHISTLEBLOWER
PROVISIONS OF DODD-FRANK 4 (May 31, 2011), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/
Documents/SECAdoptsFinalRulesImplementingDodd-FrankWhistleblowerProvisions.pdf.
5. See Jesselyn Radack & Kathleen McClellan, The Criminalization of Whistleblowing, 2 LAB. & EMP’T
L. F. 57 (2011).
6. Final Rules, supra note 3, at 5; see, e.g., New Whistleblower Law Has Corporations Running Scared
PAGE PERRY, LLC, INV. FRAUD LAWYER BLOG (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.investmentfraudlawyerblog.com/
2011/02/new_whistleblower_law_has_corp.html.
7. Final Rules, supra note 3, at 5.
8. Brian Prince, Enterprise Compliance Costs Hit $3.5 Million, Study Finds, EWEEK (Jan. 31, 2011),
http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Enterprise-Compliance-Costs-Hit-35-Million-Study-Finds-794631/; see
generally Press Release, Tripwire, Inc., Tripwire and Ponemon Institute Reveal Economic Impact of NonCompliance Exceeds Spend on Enterprise Compliance Initiatives 8 (Jan. 31, 2011), available at
http://www.tripwire.com/en/apac/company/news/pressrelease/tripwire-and-ponemon-institute-reveal-economicimpact-of-noncompliance-exceeds-spend-on-enterprise-compliance-initiatives/.
9. David L. Stulb, Driving Ethical Growth–New Markets, New Challenges, ERNST & YOUNG 11TH
GLOBAL FRAUD SURVEY 8 (2010), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-11th_Global
_Fraud_Survey/$file/ey_11th_Global_Fraud_Survey.pdf.
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their internal compliance divisions. 10 As other critics tend to agree, Springer
mentions that the advantage in promoting corporate internal hotlines is that “the
company has the ability to proactively and immediately respond to the reported
problems and then take the necessary measures to rectify any legitimate
wrongdoing.” 11
Despite these points, although utilization of internal compliance programs
by whistleblowers is not a requirement for reward eligibility, it is important to
note that SEC Rule 21F does provide incentives for whistleblowers who utilize
such programs before reporting to the SEC or other regulatory bodies. 12 Among
the incentives found in SEC Rule 21F is a 30-day time extension from the original
90-day period provided for whistleblowers who first report to an internal
compliance program before reporting to the SEC. 13 Additionally, SEC Rule 21F
calls for the SEC to consider increasing the amount of a whistleblower’s reward
when he first reports to an internal compliance program. 14 Justifying the
measures taken by the SEC, Chairwoman Mary Schapiro has stated that giving
whistleblowers the option to come directly to the SEC “makes sense because it is
the whistleblower . . . who is in the best position to know which route is best to
pursue.” 15
Not surprisingly, Dodd-Frank supporters defend the final rules on the basis
that internal compliance programs function inefficiently. 16 More specifically,
based on the grounds that senior leadership appoints internal compliance
committees, supporters argue that there is a conflict of interest due to the fact that
one of the main functions of the committee is to monitor the behaviors of corporate
senior leadership. 17 Further emphasizing this conflict of interest, Tom Sabatino, a
former lawyer for Schering Plough and United Airlines, sarcastically states,
“Every company, from Enron on down, has a great looking compliance program on
paper.” 18
Nevertheless, recent events suggest that corporations are already resorting
to other legal strategies to prevent future enforcement actions and
whistleblowing. 19 In fact, many corporate legal firms have prepared whistleblower
prevention strategies for their clients and have already added these strategies into
the curriculum of their corporate client education programs. 20 Some of these
10. Joelle Scott, Dodd Frank’s Whistleblower Provision: Who Benefits?, FORBES (June 27, 2011, 11:39 AM),
http://blogs.forbes.com/corporateresolutions/2011/06/27/dodd-franks-whistleblower-provision-who-benefits/.
11. Id.
12. 19 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6 (2011).
13. Final Rules, supra note 3, at 5–6.
14. Id.
15. See generally Michael W. Hudson, In Setback for Corporate Lobbyists, Whistleblowers Can Take
Tips First to Government Investigators, NAT’L L. REV. (May 26, 2011), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/
setback-corporate-lobbyists-whistleblowers-can-take-tips-first-to-government-investigators.
16. John R. Engen, Failure to Communicate: Walking a Fine Line with Whistleblowers, CORPORATE BD.
MEMBER 3 (2011), available at https://www.boardmember.com/MagazineArticle_Details.aspx?id=6240&
terms=walking+a+fine+ line+with+whistleblower.
17. Id. at 4.
18. Id.
19. Tom Devine, An Excellent Analysis of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, WHISTLE BLOGGER
(June 16, 2011), http://www.whistleblower.org/blog/31-2010/1196-an-excellent-analysis-of-the-dodd-frankwhistleblower-provisions-.
20. See generally Amy Goodman, et al., The New SEC Whistleblower Rules: How to Prepare Your
Company, GIBSON DUNN (June 8, 2011), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/
WebcastSlides-NewSECWhistleblowerRules-6.8.11.pdf.
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strategies involve: screening prospective new hires within the limits of federal and
state law in order to detect for whistle-blowing characteristics, regularly
reminding employees that they are required to promptly report all code of conduct
violations, and using attorneys to conduct interviews so that all of the information
obtained becomes subject to the attorney-client privilege as well as so deemed as
not “original” and thus, ineligible for an SEC whistleblower reward. 21
Given these strategies, whistleblower advocates assert that the new
measures advised by corporate legal teams will fail to pass judicial scrutiny. 22 For
example, some whistleblower lawyers challenge the screening of prospective new
hires as a practice that is not only discriminatory, but also not tolerated by most
courts. 23 In addition, others believe that the use of an attorney to conduct an
interview will not pass the judicial test concerning “whether the attorney’s
participation was for the purpose of, and actually involved, giving legal advice to
and answering legal questions of managers.” 24 Finally, many speculate that the
advice requiring employees to promptly report to internal compliance programs
will result in disparate treatment of a whistleblower while others also believe that
few corporations will adopt such measures. 25
Ultimately, despite these concerns, under Rule 21F, corporations are
expected to focus their efforts in utilizing whistleblower prevention strategies as
a result of the federal government’s continuous and increasing support for
corporate whistleblowing. 26 For example, President Obama’s 2012 budget plan is
set to allocate money for forty-five new positions in order “to expand investigation
of tips received from whistleblowers.” 27 In addition, through Dodd-Frank’s new
whistleblower provisions, 28 Congress increased the whistleblower reward
percentage that was originally proscribed by section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley. 29
Now, unlike section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley where the government was limited to
awarding whistleblowers up to ten percent of all penalties collected in a resulting
enforcement action, 30 section 922 of Dodd-Frank allows for rewards up to thirty
percent of all penalties collected in an enforcement action. 31 Finally, as recently
demonstrated by Egan v. Trading Screen, Inc., courts have given their
endorsement by allowing Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers to obtain Dodd-Frank
rewards. 32 In Egan, the New York Federal District Court held that where an
employee-whistleblower makes an internal disclosure that the corporation then

21. Id. at 38.
22. See Thad M. Guyer, Final Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Rules: Are You Prepared?, WHISTLE BLOGGER
26 (June 15, 2011), available at http://www.whistleblower.org/storage/documents/Guyer.pdf.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.; see, e.g., Devine, supra note 19.
26. See Dave Ebersole, Blowing The Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6 ENTREPREN.
BUS. L.J. 123, 125–28 (2011) (summarizing the increasing whistleblower protections since 1978).
27. Laura Walter, FY 2012 Budget Request Includes $583 Million for OSHA, EHS TODAY (Feb. 15, 2011),
http://ehstoday.com/standards/osha/budget-request-includes-millions-osha-0215/; see Engen, supra note 16;
see Hudson, supra note 15.
28. See Dodd-Frank, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 748 (2009).
29. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002)).
30. Id.
31. See Dodd-Frank, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 922 (2009).
32. Egan v. Trading Screen, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47713, 8–40 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
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self-reports, the whistleblower may be considered a joint provider of that
information, and thus eligible for an award assuming he applies for one. 33
When considering section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress found insider
trading was one of the largest problems associated with the rise in corporate
scandals involving Enron, Tyco International, Adelphia, Peregrine Systems, and
WorldCom. 34 As a result, section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley was implemented to
address this issue. Nearly eight years after creating incentives for corporate
whistleblowers under Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress faced the challenge of responding
to some of the largest recorded financial abuses in American history. Among the
more notable financial abuses was the practice by major financial institutions, like
Goldman Sachs, to trade faulty subprime mortgage-backed securities while
utilizing irresponsible lending techniques. 35 Moreover, after being bailed out by
taxpayers due to fears of a market collapse, major executives like Edward Liddy
of AIG had been caught using bailout money to pay themselves high-end
bonuses. 36
Incidentally, recent comments made by regulators and the projected
increase in settlements with the SEC further bolsters the federal government’s
unsurprising and continuing support for corporate whistleblowing. According to
agency officials inside the SEC’s whistleblower office, the volume of whistleblower
reports have substantially increased since Dodd-Frank’s passage. 37 Moreover,
while expecting the current trend to continue, Mary Schapiro states, “[w]hile the
SEC has a history of receiving a high volume of tips and complaints, the quality of
the tips we have received has been better since Section 922 [of the Dodd-Frank
Act] became law.” 38 Evidencing the merits behind these comments, a recent study
conducted by economists indicates that the SEC is on pace to settling claims with
688 defendants in 2011, which was an increase from the 681 defendants in 2010. 39
Furthermore, as of June 23, 2011, the number of company settlements has risen
by 43% to 114, an annual pace of 228, compared with 160 for the entire 2010 fiscal
year. 40
Not surprisingly, although not resulting from whistleblower reporting,
many financial firms settled with the SEC even before section 922 was enacted.
Among the more notable settlements, Goldman Sachs agreed to pay $550 million
dollars in order to quash claims of alleged violations of major federal securities

33.
34.

Id.

John Patzakis & Victor Limongelli, Internal Computer Investigations: Critical Control Activity
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, BUS. F., http://www.bizforum.org/whitepapers/guidance-2.htm (last visited Nov. 8,
2012); Kevin Rubinstein, Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806: Balancing the Interests
of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 637, 638 (2007–08) (citations omitted).
35. Leslie Wayne, Goldman Pays to End State Inquiry into Loans, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/business/12lend.html?_r=0.
36. Laurie Bennett, Edward Liddy Caught in the Middle of AIG Storm, MUCKETY (Mar. 15, 2009, 9:42
AM), http://news.muckety.com/2009/03/15/edward-liddy-caught-in-the-eye-of-aig-storm/13111.
37. See Engen, supra note 16.
38. See Hudson, supra note 15.
39. Jon Larsen, Elaine Buckberg, & James A. Overdahl, Company Settlements Jump in Number;
Individuals Make Top Payments, SEC SETTLEMENT TRENDS: 1H11 UPDATE 1 (June 23, 2011), available at
http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_SEC_Settlements_Trends_1H11_0611.pdf.
40. Id.
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laws. 41 These results indicate that whistleblowing is expected to increase given
the enactment of section 922.
Given these results while looking to the future, advocates can expect
corporations to develop and utilize more innovative whistleblower prevention
strategies. Considering that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
recently rejected the “Proxy Access” rule under Dodd-Frank, 42 one strategy for
corporations may be to challenge the legality of section 922’s whistleblower
provision. 43 Republican Senator Charles Grassley recently commented that the
Dodd-Frank whistleblower program includes undefined terms that are vague or
overbroad. 44 However, while advocates can expect new strategies, questions
regarding the specifics of these strategies remain uncertain. Regardless of this
uncertainty, one thing remains clear going forward: as long as the federal
government continues to promote corporate whistleblowing, corporations can be
expected to utilize whistleblower prevention strategies in order to avoid future
enforcement actions by the SEC.

41. Kurt Schulzke, Did Dodd-Frank Spur the SEC’s $550M Goldman Sachs Settlement?,
WHISTLEBLOWER CENT. (July 24, 2010), http://whistleblowercentral.com/2010/07/24/did-dodd-frank-spur-thesecs-550m-goldman-sachs-settlement/ (citing alleged violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
(15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)), Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and Exchange
Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5).
42. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 674 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Dodd-Frank Update: Appeals Court
Vacates SEC Proxy Access Rule, CORPORATE L. REPORT (Aug. 19, 2011), http://corporatelaw.jdsupra.com/post/
9125244838/dodd-frank-court-vacates-proxy-access.
43. See Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Denied Rule Making It Easier for Shareholders to Exercise Control Over
Corporate Boards, HUFFINGTON POST BUS. (July 22, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/
22/sec-rule-is-denied-by-court-failed-dodd-frank_n_907254.html.
44. See James Hamilton, Senator Grassley Says SEC Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Proposals Are
Overbroad; Urges SEC to Follow IRS Model in Crafting Whistleblower Office, JIM HAMILTON’S WORLD OF SEC.
REGULATION (May 22, 2011, 2:44 PM), http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/senator-grassley-sayssec-dodd-frank.html.
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